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Human Rights and Climate Change:
Shifting the Burden to the State?
by Anne Parsons*

I

n March 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council
passed Resolution 7/23 requesting intergovernmental and
international organizations to conduct “a detailed analytical study on the relationship between climate change and human
rights.”1 Resolution 7/23 is indicative of the recent global trend
that incorporates a human rights framework in climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies.2
Underlying the human rights approach to climate change is
the notion that vulnerable populations that contributed little to
the stocks of carbon emissions that cause global warming, should
not have to bear the brunt of the burden in addressing global
climate change.3 Correspondingly, protecting human rights
will better enable individuals and communities to take steps to
adapt on their own.4 Under a human rights framework, the state
is traditionally the duty-bearer, and advocates of a rights-based
approach to climate change urge governments to integrate climate change concerns into existing development policies and set
minimum human rights thresholds around which new mitigation
and adaptation policies can be developed.5 While the rightsbased approach to climate change raises many useful methodological insights, it also raises a fundamental question: how will
states that currently lack the resources or political will to fulfill
basic human rights tackle the problem of climate change?
The essential hope of orienting climate policy around human
rights is that this orientation will generate moral and legal force
within the global climate change regime.6 To start, it distinguishes between “perpetrators” of climate change and “victims”
of climate change.7 This framing of the relationship has two key
advantages from a human rights perspective. First, it highlights
litigation as a viable mechanism for holding reluctant-to-change
developed nations accountable to their climate change commitments.8 Second, it also helps provide new impetus for wealthier
nations to assist vulnerable states to adapt by providing resources
and technology.9 For example, to date, few wealthy countries
have met the agreed international aid target for adaption funding, which currently stands at 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product.10 In contrast, one study estimated the financing needed for
“immediate ‘climate proofing’” at between US$1.1 billion and
US$2.2 billion for least developed countries.11
At the national level, the logistics of implementing a rightsbased climate change policy are tricky. A rights-based approach
to climate change takes universally accepted human rights
norms as minimum thresholds by which to gauge the effects of
climate change and direct adaptation funding to where it is most
needed.12 At the same time, these thresholds ensure that the
policies implemented by governments to address the effect of
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climate change do not themselves infringe upon human rights.13
A recent total ban on charcoal in the West African country of
Chad exemplifies the latter point: the government’s response
to the pressing problem of deforestation has been widely criticized as overly harsh by the public and human rights activists
alike.14 Paradoxically, then, a human rights approach to climate
change may be hardest to implement in the countries that need it
most.15 If a government of a resource-poor state faces a pressing
environmental concern, the state’s only viable option within the
human rights framework may be to appeal to the international
community for aid.
Ultimately then, whether the human rights framework for
climate change offers anything new to the states most vulnerable
to climate change depends on those states’ ability to leverage
this discourse in negotiations vis-à-vis the international community. This will require these states to invoke human rights
discourses in new ways, since human rights have traditionally
been concerned with the state-individual relationship.16 In the
past, climate change negotiations have marginalized resourcepoor countries in need of adaptation funding.17 Resource-poor
states may be able to invoke procedural rights (right to participation, right to information) as a means of gaining access to these
negotiations.18 Similarly, asserting the right to development
may help developing nations articulate their concerns about the
impacts of climate change on their ability to protect their citizens’ human rights.19 Integral to the human rights framework
on climate change is the notion that powerful nations should
recognize developing states’ right to actively participate in the
development of a global strategy on climate change as both an
ethical obligation and the only means of attaining a sustainable
solution.

Endnotes:
1

H.R.C. Res. 7/23, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/23 (Mar. 28, 2008).

2

See, e.g,. Mary Robinson, Climate Change Is An Issue of Human Rights,
The Independent (London), Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/
opinion/commentators/mary-robinson-climate-change-is-an-issue-of-humanrights-1059360.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
3

See id.

4

See Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The
Human Rights Impact of Climate Change, U.N. Doc. DPI/2483 (Nov. 2007),
available at http://www.un.org/climatechange/pdfs/bali/ohchr-bali07-19.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

Endnotes: Human Rights and Climate Change continued on page 68
*Anne Parsons is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washington College of Law.

22

59

6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law Torts § 1414 (10th ed. 2005).

60

Goodwin v. Reilley, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1985).

61

Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. City of Redondo Beach, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337,
344 (Ct. App. 1994).
62 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1979) (stating that a person that carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for harm
caused by that activity).
63

Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 584.

64

Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Cassinos court considered two similar
Oklahoma cases. In those cases, waste water migrated into space devoid of
oil or gas, causing the courts to find no damages. See W. Edmond Salt Water
Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 969 (Okla. 1950) (stating that
“if . . . disposal of salt water is forbidden unless oil producers first obtain the
consent of all persons under whose lands it may migrate . . . , underground
disposal would be practically prohibited); Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co.,
112 P.2d 792, 794-96 (Okla. 1941).
65

In Chance, defendant BP injected waste water containing dissolved salts
and other organics, into saline pore space 2,500 feet below the surface using
deep well technology. 670 N.E.2d 985, 986-87 (Ohio 1996). Plaintiffs brought
a class action for subsurface trespass, nuisance, negligence, ultrahazardous
activity, fraud, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleging extensive
migration. See id. at 987-89. In affirming the trial court’s finding that no damages existed for trespass, the Ohio Supreme Court held that plaintiffs failed to
“to prove some physical damages or interference with use proximately caused
by the deepwells . . . [such] that the injectate interfered with the reasonable and
foreseeable use of their properties.” Id. at 993. In addition, because of the number of variables in determining the existence and extent of migration, including
the permeability, porosity, and thickness of the injection strata, the diffusion of
the waste into the saline, and the degradation of the substances over time, plaintiffs could not prove a property invasion as a factual matter. Id. at 994.
66

See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Wilson & Mark A. de Figueiredo, Geologic Carbon
Dioxide Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, 36 Envtl.
Law Rep. 10114 (2006). See generally Moore, supra note 8.

70

Statutes such as the CWA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
and the Clean Air Act contain permit shield language, which protect permittees
from certain types of liability. For example, CWA Section 402(k) states that
“[c]ompliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed
[to be] compliance.” 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(k) (West 2008). If a permit holder
discharges pollutants in compliance with its permit, it will be shielded from
CWA civil or criminal liability. Several courts have addressed the scope of the
permit shield. See generally, e.g., Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of
Carroll County, Md., 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Atl. States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2nd Cir. 1993).
71

See generally, e.g., Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d 255; see also Chance v.
BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 986-87 (Ohio 1996).
72

See Letter from Cynthia C. Dougherty, Director, Office of Ground Water and
Drinking Water, and Brian McLean, Director, Office of Atmospheric Programs,
to Water Management Division Directors, Air Division Directors, & EPA
Regions I to X (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/
pdfs/guide_uic_carbonsequestration_final-03-07.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
73 The possibility of classification of CO as a pollutant under the Clean Air
2
Act or any other statute should be irrelevant to the permitting process itself, as
compliance with a SDWA permit is a distinct issue.
74

For example, Greenpeace has made its opposition to GCCS clear. See
g enerally Emily Rochon et al., Greenpeace Int’l, False Hope: Why Carbon
Capture and Storage Won’t Save the Climate (2008), available at http://
www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/reports4/false-hope-why-carbon-capture
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
75

See generally Cal. Const. art. XI.

76

Vitaly V. Adushkin et al., Seismicity in the Oil Field, Oilfield Rev.
(Summer 2000), available at http://www.slb.com/media/services/resources/
oilfieldreview/ors00/sum00/p2_17.pdf.
77

H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008).

78

Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3261 (2006); Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3251 (2001);
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3862 (2001).

79

68

Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program for
Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492 (July 25,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).

Three levels of coverage exist: First, nuclear plant operators must maintain
individual insurance at mandated levels; second, each operator contributes up
to the industry statutory cap; and third, the federal treasury provides coverage
beyond the sum of the individual and industry combined levels. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2210 (West 2006).

69

80

42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2006).

81

See, e.g., Task Force, supra note 28.

82

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f (West 2009).

67

42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1996).

Id. The proposed measures include mapping nearby underground drinking
water and ensuring injection, confinement, and containment zones; periodic
review, modification and corrective action; deep-well construction procedures
accounting for nature of CO2; testing and monitoring of groundwater quality
and CO2 plume; 50-year post-injection site care and closure plans; and demonstrated financial assurances.

Endnotes: Human Rights and Climate Change continued from page 22
5 See Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Climate Change and Human
Rights: A Rough Guide 13 (2008) [hereinafter Rough Guide], available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/submissions/136_
report.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

11

6

12

See Rough Guide, supra note 5, at 7.

13

See id. at 7 n.15.

See Sara C. Aminzadeh, Note, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights
Implications of Climate Change, 30 Hasting Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 231,
258-59 (2007).
7

Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Submission to the Officer of the
High Comm’r for Human Rights In Regard to Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 2, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/
docs/submissions/ICHRSubmission.pdf.

See United Nations Development Program, Fighting Climate Change:
Human Solidarity In A Divided World 192 (2007/2008), available at http://
hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2009)

14

See Celeste Hicks, Chad Charcoal Ban Enflames Public, BBC News, Jan.
27, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7853250.stm (last visited Feb. 14,
2009) (estimating that more than 60% of Chad’s natural tree cover has been cut
for the production of charcoal).

15

8

See Rough Guide, supra note 5, at 59.

See Rough Guide, supra note 5, at 19.

16

9

See id. at 85.

See id. at 76.

17

See id. at 52.

10

See Kate Raworth Et Al., Oxfam, Climate wrongs and Human Rights:
Putting People At the Heart of Climate Change Policy 20 (2008), available
at http://www.oxfam.org/files/bp117-climate-wrongs-and-human-rights-0809.
pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (estimating the annual cost of adaptation in all
developing countries to be $50 billion).

Winter 2009

18

Cf. id. at 52 (noting criticism levied at donor countries for attempting to
avoid a participatory process that includes developing countries).
19

See id. at 76.

68

